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Real Property
Erica L. Burchell*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys developments in Georgia real property law
between June 1, 2020 and May 31, 2021. 1 Real property law is unique in
that it touches nearly every other facet of the law in some way. For
instance, family law often intersects with real property law in cases of
divorce. Contract law is often at the root of any real property sales or
agreements—and also comes into play with issues of landlord-tenant
disputes and evictions. Since real property can be, and often is, the
largest asset people leave behind when they pass away, real property law
certainly impacts estate law. Environmental law includes questions of
land use and resource management. Real property law is highly
impactful and interesting, even for those who do not practice in the area.
II. ADVERSE POSSESSION
Adverse possession occurs when a party can show possession that is
exclusive, not originating in fraud, “public, continuous, exclusive,
uninterrupted, [ ] peaceable” and “accompanied by a claim of right.” 2 The
party claiming prescriptive title—that is, the would be adverse
possessor—bears the burden of proving, by the preponderance of the
evidence, that the elements outlined in O.C.G.A. § 44-5-161(a) have been
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1. For an analysis of last year’s real property law during the Survey period, see Linda
Findley, Real Property, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 72 MERCER L. REV. 255 (2020).
2. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-161(a) (2021).
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met for a twenty-year period.3
In Houston v. James,4 a fight over twenty-eight acres of land ensued
between family members following the death of the original land owner,
who was the father of the three dueling siblings. In this case, two sisters,
Sue James Houston and Teresa James Potts, brought an appeal of the
Rabun Superior Court’s order that fifteen acres willed to them by their
father had been acquired through prescriptive title by their brother, Tom
E. James, Jr.5 The sisters argued that the grant of summary judgment in
favor of James was inappropriate because there were material issues of
fact to be decided regarding James’s claim of right, whether his
possession was permissive, and whether his possession of the land had
been exclusive.6 On a de novo review of the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a question of material
fact existed as to the time period of James’s possession under claim of
right.7
The story goes something like this: back in the 1970’s, James’s father,
the landowner, gave James permission to build a house and move a
trailer onto the property. James contended that his father told him that
he did own, or promised him that he would one day own, all twenty-eight
acres the father had. James’s sisters begged to differ. Houston and Potts,
the sisters, argued that their father had repeatedly told them he would
leave an acre to each of his children, grandchildren, and greatgrandchildren upon his passing, and that James would receive ten acres.
The parties produced no evidence as to their father’s wishes. James
asserted in his complaint that back in 1979 his father changed his wishes
about James living on the property and ordered James to vacate the
property.8 According to the complaint, James refused to leave, claimed
the property as his own, and occupied the property exclusively for thirty
years, exercising “exclusive possession, dominion, and control of the
property to the exclusion of all others.”9
Despite the pronouncements made by James in his complaint, in
documents submitted in support of a new trial, James stated that his
father held title to the land up until his 2017 death and referred to his

3. See Houston v. James, 358 Ga. App. 510, 513, 855 S.E.2d 714, 717 (2021) (citing
Dyal v. Sanders, 194 Ga. 228, 233, 21 S.E.2d 596, 600 (1942); O.C.G.A. § 44-5-163 (2021)).
4. 358 Ga. App. 510, 855 S.E.2d 714 (2021).
5. Id. at 510–11, 855 S.E.2d at 716.
6. Id. at 513, 855 S.E.2d at 717.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 511, 855 S.E.2d at 716.
9. Id. at 511–12, 855 S.E.2d at 716.
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father as the “predecessor in title” to his sisters.10 James even admitted
that back in 1982, his father deeded him 0.96 acres of the property. Part
of the deeded property included the land where James’s house sits. No
other property was deeded to James at that time. James paid taxes on
the 0.96 acres, while his father paid the taxes on the remaining land. In
depositions, both sisters testified that James asked his father for ten
acres of land back in 2014, angering their father. Furthermore, the
sisters contended that their father helped to build a barn located on the
property and also helped to furnish cattle and seed. 11
In 2017, the father died.12 A 2016 will made by the father left roughly
fifteen acres to the two sisters and roughly twelve acres in a life estate to
James. Remember, 0.96 of an acre had already been deeded to James by
his father inter vivos. After the death of his father, James filed an action
for declaratory judgment. In the action, James sought to obtain title by
adverse possession to the fifteen acres willed to his sisters by their father.
Moreover, James wanted an injunction to prevent his sisters from
occupying or selling the land. James’s sisters counterclaimed, and
requested an injunction to prevent their brother from trespassing on
their land. Houston and Potts also requested attorney’s fees for frivolous
litigation. Subsequently, James moved for summary judgment, which the
trial court granted.13
In their appeal, Houston and Potts contended that material issues of
fact existed.14 Namely, the sisters argued that there was a question as to
(1) James’s claim of right to the land, (2) whether he possessed the land
by permission, and (3) whether his possession was exclusive. Without
addressing the issues of permission and exclusivity, the court of appeals
agreed with the sisters that a question of material fact did exist with
regard to James’s claim of right to the property. Accordingly, the court of
appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment. 15
The court of appeals explained that a “claim of right” is equivalent to
a “claim of title” and a “claim of ownership.”16A claim of right need not be
together with a claim of title from a predecessor, but a claim of right does
require a claim of title “in the sense that the possessor claims this

10. Id. at 512, 855 S.E.2d at 716.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 513, 855 S.E.2d at 717.
15. Id. at 516, 855 S.E.2d. at 718.
16. Id. at 513, 855 S.E.2d at 717 (citing Walker v. Sapelo Island Heritage Auth., 285
Ga. 194, 196, 674 S.E.2d 925, 927 (2009); Simmons v. Cmty. Renewal & Redemption, LLC,
286 Ga. 6, 6, 685 S.E.2d 75, 75 (2009)).
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property as his own.”17 The assertion of dominion over a property gives
rise to a presumption of claim of right—particularly when valuable
improvements provide the basis for assertion of dominion. 18 The court of
appeals cautioned, however, that the exercise of dominion alone does not
dispense with the possessor’s need to show claim of right when conflicting
evidence as to claim of right is presented.19
The court went on to note that though adverse possession can arise
through innocent or mistaken possession, knowledge that a piece of
property belongs to someone else is fatal to any claim of adverse
possession.20 The death of the adverse possession claim occurs because of
the requirement of good faith. 21 In James’s case, evidence existed that
James may have exercised dominion over the full twenty-eight acres of
land. James’s sisters even acknowledged that since the 1970’s, James has
farmed the land, erected buildings on the land, parked his vehicles on the
land, and sold hay from the property. These factors are indicators of
possession.22 Moreover, there is evidence that the sisters and father
believed James had taken the land, against his father’s will, as far back
as the 1980’s.23 But, the court of appeals noted that there is also evidence
that James occupied the land with the knowledge that his father kept
title to the full twenty-eight acres. James admitted his father had a
change of heart regarding the land in 1979. Moreover, James admitted
to the deeding of 0.96 acres by his father in 1982. James’s father only
deeded the 0.96 acres to James at the time, and nothing more. Sometime
after that deed was delivered, James went to his father and requested a
grant of an additional ten acres, which James’s father refused.24
The court of appeals also cited James’s reference to his father as his
sister’s predecessor in title and James’s statement that his father
retained title to the property until his father’s death in 2017. 25 These
facts, the court of appeals held, created a question of fact as to whether
James knew the property did not belong to him.26 These facts are critical,
because where a claimant admits that another holds title, such an
17. Houston, 358 Ga. App. at 513, 855 S.E.2d at 717 (quoting Simmons, 286 Ga. at 6,
685 S.E.2d at 77).
18. Id. (quoting Childs v. Sammons, 272 Ga. 737, 739, 534 S.E.2d 409, 410 (2000)).
19. Houston, 358 Ga. App. at 513, 855 S.E.2d at 717.
20. Id. at 513–14, 855 S.E.2d at 717.
21. Id. at 514, 855 S.E.2d at 717 (citing Halpern v. Lacy Investment Corp., 259 Ga.
264, 265, 379 S.E.2d at 520, 520 (1989)).
22. Id. at 514, 855 S.E.2d at 717–18 (citing Walker,285 Ga. at 198, 674 S.E.2d at 928).
23. Id. at 514, 855 S.E.2d at 718.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 514–15, 855 S.E.2d at 718.
26. Id. at 515, 855 S.E.2d at 718.
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admission is fatal to a claim of right. 27 The court of appeals, reviewing
whether a grant of summary judgment was appropriate, and thus
reviewing the case de novo and drawing inferences favorable to James’s
sisters, held that an issue of material fact existed. The court of appeals
noted that evidence in the record could support a reasonable inference
that James was nothing more than a trespasser—and that is for a jury
to decide.28 The court of appeals thus reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment.29
III. EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, AND BOUNDARIES
Easements, generally speaking, grant certain rights to the holder of
the easement—allowing the holder to use someone else’s land for a
specific purpose. Alternatively, declarations of covenants often restrict a
property owner from doing certain activities on their own land. Simply
stated, easements often grant rights to non-property owners as they
concern another person’s piece of property. By contrast, declarations of
covenants take away or limit the rights of property owners as they
concern their own pieces of property. Boundary disputes spring up when
there is a question as to the legal borders of a certain piece, or pieces, of
property.
The recently decided case of Doxey v. Crissey30 begged the question of
whether pedestrians could be required to hold their horses—that is, not
to walk upon a bridle trail easement located on a lot owned by Carolyn
Doxey in the Oakton subdivision. Doxey’s property backs up to the
Kennesaw Mountain National Park31—which includes hiking and
walking trails32—and the bridle trail easement connects the street
fronting Doxey’s property with the park. 33 Residents of the subdivision
where Doxey lived used the bridle trail easement area to access the park
on foot. Eventually, in the early 2000s, Doxey erected a fence across the
back of her lot, adding a gate that allowed access to the park. However,
by 2004, the gate was “nailed shut and then removed,” blocking access to

27. Id. (citing Simmons, 286 Ga. at 7, 685 S.E.2d at 77–78).
28. Id. (referring to Ga. Power Co. v. Irvin, 267 Ga. 760, 766, 482 S.E.2d 362, 368
(1997)).
29. Id. at 516, 855 S.E.2d at 718.
30. 355 Ga. App. 891, 846 S.E.2d 166 (2020).
31. Id. at 892, 846 S.E.2d at 168.
32. Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park Georgia, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, https://www.nps.gov/kemo/index.htm (last visited
Sept. 1, 2021).
33. Doxey, 355 Ga. App. at 892, 846 S.E.2d at 168.
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the park from Doxey’s property.34
In 2018, ten fellow residents of Oakton subdivision brought suit
against her—seeking a permanent injunction against Doxey.35 The
plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin Doxey from obstructing the
easement. Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought to require Doxey to remove
the fences blocking the easement. At a bench trial, the plaintiffs were
successful. The Cobb Superior Court declared that all Oakton subdivision
residents could enforce the easement—whether equestrian or pedestrian.
Moreover, the trial court granted the permanent injunction against
Doxey, meaning she could no longer obstruct or interfere with the
residents’ easement use. Clearly not horsing around, the trial court also
ordered Doxey to remove the fence that blocked the easement. 36
Doxey appealed.37 In what was essentially a three-pronged attack,
Doxey first argued that the trial court erred by considering parol
evidence to ascertain the meaning of “bridle trail.” 38 Second, Doxey
argued that the trial court erred in their “finding that the bridle trail
easement had not been abandoned by nonuse.”39 Third, Doxey argued
that the restriction of her prior counsel’s testimony amounted to error. 40
Addressing Doxey’s first argument, the Georgia Court of Appeals
agreed with Doxey that the trial court did in fact err in considering parol
evidence as to the meaning of “bridle trail.”41 The appellate court
concluded that the term bridle trail is unambiguous and cannot be
otherwise reasonably interpreted.42 Accordingly, the court determined
that the easement is for horseback riding and that the fact that the
easement could also be suitable for other purposes did not create an
ambiguity in the term bridle trail. After settling the issue of parol
evidence, the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for
further proceedings—because while the term bridle trail may be
unambiguous, easements can change. 43 Easements can change in
frequency, manner, and intensity of use without one party’s consent if
the change does not unreasonably damage the servient estate or cause

34. Id.
35. Id. at 892, 846 S.E.2d at 169.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 892, 846 S.E.2d at 169.
39. Id. at 894, 846 S.E.2d at 170.
40. Id. For purposes of this writing, Doxey’s first and second arguments are
particularly relevant.
41. Id. at 892, 846 S.E.2d at 169.
42. Id. at 893, 846 S.E.2d at 169.
43. Id. at 893–94, 846 S.E.2d at 169.
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unreasonable interference with its enjoyment. 44 The appellate court
acknowledged that the easement’s transition from a horseback riding
trail to a walking and running trail coincides with a change in frequency,
manner, and intensity of use that would be permissible without Doxey’s
consent if no unreasonable damage was done to Doxey’s property and if
the change did not result in an unreasonable interference of Doxey’s
enjoyment of her property.45 No consideration of a change in use’s impact
was made by the trial court at trial. 46 Accordingly, the appellate court
remanded the decision to the lower court for further proceedings on the
issue of a change in easement.47
Doxey’s second argument hinged on the idea that the trial court erred
in finding that the bridle trail easement had not been abandoned by
nonuse.48 The appellate court disagreed. Generally speaking, after a
sufficient period of time, easements can be forfeited by nonuse or lost due
to abandonment—in other words, you use it or you lose it. 49 However, a
special rule applies to easements obtained by grant. To dispense with an
easement by grant, there must be a clear showing of intent to abandon.
Trial evidence showed that Oakton residents used Doxey’s property for
pedestrian access to the park, and that such access continued until Doxey
blocked such access. Accordingly, the appellate court upheld the trial
court’s finding that the easement was not abandoned.50
After the case went back down to the trial court, the court determined
that the easement had changed in frequency, manner, and use, and was
not doing unreasonable harm to Doxey or interfering unreasonably with
her enjoyment of her land.51 Doxey again appealed, contending that the
trial court erred in “failing to conduct ‘further evidentiary proceedings’”
on the questions the court of appeals posed to the trial court for
consideration on remand.52 The appellate court agreed with Doxey,
reasoning that since the trial court failed to take any action that
constituted a proceeding before issuing its order, the judgment must be
vacated. The court of appeals issued its opinion on June 10, 2021, thus
falling just outside of the Survey period.53
44. Id. at 894, 846 S.E.2d at 169.
45. Id. at 893–94, 846 S.E.2d at 169.
46. Id. at 894, 846 S.E.2d at 169.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 894, 846 S.E.2d at 170.
49. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-9-6 (2021)).
50. Id.
51. Doxey v. Crissey et al., 359 Ga. App. 695, 698–99, 859 S.E.2d 849, 851–52 (2021).
52. Id. at 699, 859 S.E.2d at 852.
53. Id. at 695, 859 S.E.2d at 849. While pertinent to mention in short, Doxey’s second
appeal and any future decisions in this case should be discussed in forthcoming articles.
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In a separate case, the Georgia Court of Appeals reviewed a
maintenance agreement contained within a shopping center easement. 54
In Alterman Properties LLC v. Sunshine Plaza Associates LTD, the court
of appeals examined the common area expense responsibilities of the
2021 shopping center owners and tenants based on a 1961 easement
drafted by the 2021 parties’ predecessors in interest. 55 Sunshine Plaza
Associates LTD—the owner of the Atlanta shopping center—brought a
breach of contract action against Alterman Properties LLC (APL)—the
owner of a grocery store located in the shopping center—seeking payment
for common maintenance expenses listed within an easement for the
shopping center property. The trial court issued a partial grant of
summary judgment in favor of Sunshine Plaza Associates LTD. APL
appealed, contending that the trial court erred in three ways. APL argued
that the trial court erred in determining, as a matter of law, that (1) APL
was responsible to pay twenty-five percent of the maintenance expenses,
(2) that Sunshine Plaza proved its damages, and (3) that an affidavit from
APL’s manager failed to create material issues of fact. 56 The court of
appeals reviewed the evidence leading to the grant of summary judgment
on a de novo standard and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.57
The 1961 easement at issue in this case directed that for ten years the
shopping center owners would pay the costs of “maintaining lighting,
paving, policing, cleaning[,] and necessary marking of parking areas.” 58
After the ten-year period was up—in what would be 1971—the retail
owners would then share responsibility from time to time for the common
maintenance expenses. The amount each retail owner owed was
determined by their relative square footage owned within the shopping
center as a whole—as measured by a plat attached to the easement.59
In 2013, APL leased its property to a grocery store business. 60 The
lease provided that the grocery store owner would be responsible for
APL’s portion of common area expenses. Sunshine Plaza typically issued
common area expense bills not to owners, but directly to tenants. Five
years later, in 2018, Sunshine Plaza sued APL for breach of contract,
alleging that APL had not paid its share of common maintenance

54. Alterman Prop’s. LLC v. Sunshine Plaza Assoc’s Ltd., 358 Ga. App. 698, 698, 856
S.E.2d 91, 92 (2021).
55. Id. at 699, 856 S.E.2d at 92–93.
56. Id. at 700–02, 856 S.E.2d at 93–95.
57. Id. at 699, 856 S.E.2d at 92 n.1.
58. Id. at 699, 856 S.E.2d at 92–93.
59. Id. at 699, 856 S.E.2d at 93.
60. Id.
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expenses since 2014. Sunshine Plaza sought roughly $41,000.00 as of
April 2018—the twenty-five percent share APL purportedly owed—along
with attorney fees. APL answered the suit and filed a third-party
complaint against the grocery store owner tenant. After discovery,
Sunshine Plaza presented a motion for summary judgment, which the
trial court granted in part. The trial court awarded Sunshine Plaza
roughly $60,000.00 in damages for the breach of contract claim, and
found issues of material fact remaining on the issue of attorney fees. APL
appealed.61
On appeal, APL first argued that the trial court erred in finding that
the type of expenses sought by Sunshine Plaza qualified as common
expenses laid out in the easement and that the easement required APL
to pay a twenty-five percent share of those expenses. 62 Identifying this
claim of error as a question of contract construction, the court of appeals
reviewed de novo, and agreed in part with APL. In contract construction,
the court must attempt to ascertain the intent of the parties. To identify
the intent of the parties, the court first examines the language within the
contract itself. Absent ambiguity, the court will use the contract itself to
find the intent of the parties.63
Sunshine Plaza itemized the costs it sought from APL—and the list
of itemized costs included charges for parking lot light electricity, a pylon
sign, landscaping, and security.64 On appeal, APL argued that the
easement language did not cover costs for pylon signage, landscaping or
security.65 The court of appeals dispensed immediately with APL’s
contention regarding “security”—noting that the easement contained the
word “policing,” which is synonymous with security. 66 Next, the court of
appeals addressed that electricity for the pylon sign was covered by the
“lighting” expenses called for in the easement.67 The court of appeals
turned next to the word “landscaping,” which was not explicitly
addressed in the easement.68 Reviewing a grant of summary judgment de
novo, the court of appeals held that some of the landscaping expenses
Sunshine Plaza sought may include work not covered by the easement’s
“paving” or “cleaning” categories.69 Therefore, the court of appeals held

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 700, 856 S.E.2d at 93.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 700, 856 S.E.2d at 93–94.
Id. at 701, 856 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 701, 856 S.E.2d at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Sunshine
Plaza with regard to the landscaping expenses. 70
APL contended next that the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of
law that APL owed twenty-five percent of any shared maintenance
common expenses.71 To support its contention, APL submitted an
affidavit from its manager that included a document showing APL’s
actual ownership percentage within the shopping center to be roughly
fifteen percent of the whole. The court of appeals tossed that contention—
pointing APL to the language within the easement itself.72 The easement
directed that the sums owed were to be determined by the square footage
owned and that the square footage was shown on an attached plat. 73
Because the easement language dealt directly with the issue of
determining percentages, the court of appeals held that APL’s exhibit
failed to create an issue of material fact regarding the calculation of
APL’s shared expenses.74
APL argued second that Sunshine Plaza failed to prove damages. 75
The court of appeals did not agree. APL argued that to sufficiently prove
damages, Sunshine Plaza needed to produce the actual invoices it
received from vendors.76 However, the court of appeals reasoned that an
affidavit from Philip Sunshine, which was based on personal knowledge,
verified the expense summary that Sunshine Plaza provided.
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the trial court did not err in
granting summary judgment to Sunshine Plaza on the issue of amounts
sought from APL.77
APL argued third that an affidavit and exhibit from Richard Alterman
created factual questions regarding percentages of ownership and that
the trial court erred when it excluded them as hearsay. 78 Again, the court
of appeals pointed to the language contained within the easement itself
that outlined the method for calculating percentages. Since the easement
was clear on this issue, no ambiguity existed that would give rise to the
need to look outside the easement. 79

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 701–02, 856 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 702, 856 S.E.2d at 94.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 702, 856 S.E.2d at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 703, 856 S.E.2d at 95.
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In brief, the court of appeals held that the evidence presented by
Sunshine Plaza in support of its motion for summary judgment was
sufficient to support a finding of liability on the part of APL as a matter
of law, with the exception of the landscaping expenses. 80
IV. HEIR PROPERTY
In Morton v. Pitts, the Georgia Court of Appeals examined a recent
action for partition brought forth under the Georgia Uniform Partition of
Heirs Property Act (the UPHPA) 82. In a case of pure statutory
interpretation—and of the question of mandatory or permissive
language—the court of appeals held that the Early Superior Court erred
in following the UPHPA when the trial court failed to order an appraisal
of the property being partitioned. 83 The court of appeals reasoned that
when the UPHPA procedures include the word “shall,” the procedures
are mandatory, and that the trial court erred by declining to follow
them.84
Georgia’s UPHPA applies to partition actions for qualifying heirs
property.85 In Morton, the trial court found, and all parties agreed, that
the subject property was qualified heirs property. 86 Georgia’s UPHPA
safeguards due process protections for heirs in the partition action and
also creates an avenue for a court-supervised “commercially reasonable”
sale.87 One of the requirements under the UPHPA is that the property
being partitioned be appraised. 88 There are two exceptions to the
appraisal requirement: (1) if there is unanimous agreement among the
co-tenants as to the value of the property;89 and (2) if the court
determines the cost of the appraisal exceeds any potential evidentiary
value of the appraisal, then the court holds an evidentiary hearing, sets
the fair market value, and notifies the parties of the value. 90
When Morton brought her action for partition, she requested the trial
court order an appraisal.91 Morton continued requesting an appraisal
81

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
357 Ga. App. 513, 851 S.E.2d 141 (2020).
Id. at 513, 851 S.E.2d at 142; see O.C.G.A. §§ 44-6-180 to 44-6-189.1 (2021).
Morton, 357 Ga. App. at 513, 851 S.E.2d 142.
Id. at 513–14, 851 S.E.2d at 142.
Id. at 513, 851 S.E.2d at 142.
Id.
Id. (quoting Faison v. Faison, 344 Ga. App. 600, 602, 811 S.E.2d 431, 433 (2018)).
Id. at 514, 851 S.E.2d at 142–43 (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-6-184(a) (2021)).
Id. at 514, 851 S.E.2d at 143 (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-6-184(b)).
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-6-184(c)).
Id. at 513, 851 S.E.2d at 142.
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throughout the trial court’s proceedings. The other parties to the action
sought to use an appraisal ordered by Morton in 2018, which valued the
property at $2,185,000.00. Morton objected, citing the appraisal’s age,
arguing that the 2018 appraisal would not accurately determine the
property’s current fair market value. Nevertheless, the trial court
persisted, using the 2018 appraisal to set the fair market value at
$2,185,000.00. Morton appealed.92
The court of appeals agreed with Morton, deciding that the trial court
erred in failing to order an appraisal. 93 The court of appeals reasoned
that because neither of the appraisal exceptions applied in this case, the
trial court had no choice but to order an appraisal of the property. 94 The
trial court was bound by the UPHPA’s mandatory language, which
demanded an appraisal be ordered and be considered in assessing the
property’s fair market value.95 Consequently, the court of appeals
vacated the order of the trial court and remanded the case back to the
trial court for additional proceedings.96
V. MATERIALMEN’S LIEN
In Massey et al. v. Duke Builders, Inc. 97 the Georgia Supreme Court
addressed the questions of whether materialmen’s liens may include
anticipated profits and if not, whether a lien filed against a property
owner that includes anticipated profits is therefore void in its entirety.98
In short, the supreme court held while anticipated profits may not be
included in a materialmen’s lien, their inclusion alone does not render
the entire materialmen’s lien void.99
In 2013, a fire destroyed the home of John and Stephanie Massey.100
The Masseys hired a contractor to build them a new home. The Masseys
paid the contractor, Duke Builders, Inc., on a project-by-project basis as
the work was completed. When the contractor was paid, the payment
included materials, labor, and a contractor’s fee to Duke Builders, the
last of which varied according to the project. The Masseys and Duke
Builders had some disagreements, and in April of 2015, the Masseys
hired a new contractor. Just a month later, in May of 2015, Duke Builders
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
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Id. at 153, 849 S.E.2d at 187–88.
Id. at 153, 849 S.E.2d at 188.

2021

REAL PROPERTY

229

filed a nearly $200,000.00 materialmen’s lien against the Massey’s
property. The lien included roughly $146,000.00 towards work already
completed—including labor, materials, and profits. A little over
$50,000.00 of the lien was for profits Duke Builders anticipated earning
based on the estimated completion of the home.101
In November of 2015, the Masseys filed suit against Duke Builders
for breach of contract and other things.102 Duke Builders answered and
filed counterclaims. In March of 2018, the Masseys renewed a previously
denied motion for summary judgment, arguing that the lien filed by Duke
Builders should not have included anticipated profits. The trial court
ruled in favor of the Masseys, holding the lien amount illegal and indeed
declaring the entire lien void. The trial court ordered the lien be marked
cancelled.103
Duke Builders appealed the trial court’s order for cancellation of its
lien.104 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling
with regard to the inclusion of anticipated profits—namely, that it was
not allowed—a win for the Masseys. However, in a win for Duke Builders,
Inc., the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s holding that the lien
was void in its entirety.105 The supreme court affirmed the court of
appeals on both issues.106
The supreme court agreed with the court of appeals that anticipated
profits may not be included in a materialmen’s lien. 107 The court reasoned
that under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361(c),108 only amounts due and owing can
be included in the lien amount.109 So, while a materialmen’s lien can
include overhead costs, profit, labor, and material costs for work already
completed,110 it may not include expected earnings for future work not
completed at the time of the lien.111
Turning to the issue of whether improper inclusion of anticipated
profits rendered the entire lien void, the supreme court again affirmed
the court of appeals.112 The supreme court cited precedent dating as far
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back as 1917113 to support the notion that a claim will not be defeated
simply because the claim exceeds the claimant’s right. Instead, the valid
part of the claim will be upheld, and the invalid portion fails. 114

113. Id. (citing Pace v. Shields-Geise Lumber Co., 147 Ga. 36, 92 S.E.2d 755 (1917)).
114. Id.

